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Mitigating Power Imbalance in Eviction
Mediation: A Model for Minnesota
Rebecca Hare†
“The home is the wellspring of personhood. It is where our
identity takes root and blossoms, where as children, we
imagine, play, and question . . . . When we try to understand
ourselves, we often begin by considering the kind of home in
which we were raised.”1

Introduction
In Evicted, Matthew Desmond argues “[e]viction is a cause, not
just a condition, of poverty.”2 From court process, to policy, to its
principal players, eviction is both rooted in and continues to
perpetuate economic, social, and health inequalities among those
experiencing poverty.3 Individuals trying to navigate eviction often
experience adverse effects on their employment as a result of taking
time off to find a new place and moving their lives on a tight,
predetermined schedule.4 When families are uprooted by eviction,
their children may experience disruption in their education, which
can have long-term implications for their academic achievement. 5
School mobility among low-income children “introduces
discontinuity in learning environments that can adversely affect
learning, . . . disrupt[s] children’s instructional environments[,]
. . . disrupt[s] children’s relationships with peers and teachers, and
†. Rebecca Hare, M.L.I.S., J.D. Candidate, May 2020, University of Minnesota
Law School. The author thanks Lawrence McDonough for his time discussing this
article and for his contributions to landlord-tenant law in Minnesota; Dawn Zugay,
Anna Rios, and Sandra Moberg-Walls for their time discussing eviction mediation
practices; Prentiss Cox and Anna Barton for their thoughtful feedback throughout
the writing process; and both Samuel Spaid and Eric Hauge for their collaboration
and guidance in conducting the eviction studies of Brooklyn Park and St. Paul cited
herein and for their continuing advocacy on behalf of tenants in Minnesota.
1. MATTHEW DESMOND, EVICTED: POVERTY AND PROFIT IN THE AMERICAN CITY
293 (2016).
2. Id. at 299.
3. Id.
4. Matthew Desmond & Carl Gershenson, Housing and Employment Insecurity
Among the Working Poor, 63 SOC. PROBS. 46, 49–50, 59 (2016).
5. Judy A. Temple & Arthur J. Reynolds, School Mobility and Achievement:
Longitudinal Findings from an Urban Cohort, 37 J. SCH. PSYCHOL. 355, 357 (1999).
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reduce[s] the stability and predictability of established patterns of
activities . . . .”6 Living in a constant state of stress due to housing
insecurity can also result in negative health outcomes. 7 Even the
threat of eviction has been found to contribute to depression,
anxiety, poor health, elevated blood pressure, and unhealthy
behaviors.8
Beyond the individual impacts of evictions, evictions hurt
communities.9 Community instability, job loss, education
disruption, homelessness, and diversion of sheriff time impact
communities where evictions take place. 10 Communities also end up
bearing added costs of social services, homeless shelters, education,
and healthcare to address these issues. 11 For these reasons, eviction
prevention should concern everyone—private eviction has public
costs.
Mediation may be used to improve outcomes in eviction cases,
both to prevent eviction filings and to resolve eviction disputes. 12
6. Id.
7. Matthew Desmond & Rachel Tolbert Kimbro, Eviction’s Fallout: Housing,
Hardship, and Health, 94 SOC. FORCES 295, 296 (2015) (“Compared to those not
evicted, mothers who were evicted in the previous year experienced more material
hardship, were more likely to suffer from depression, reported worse health for
themselves and their children, and reported more parenting stress.”).
8. Hugo Vásquez-Vera et al., The Threat of Home Eviction and Its Effects on
Health Through the Equity Lens, 175 SOC. SCI. & MED. 199, 205 (2017).
9. Deena Greenberg, Carl Gershenson & Matthew Desmond, Discrimination in
Evictions: Empirical Evidence and Legal Challenges, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 115,
117–18 (2016).
10. Id. at 118. A recent study investigating the link between eviction and
homelessness found 22.4% of individuals staying at homeless shelters in Hennepin
County from 2008-2016 had a corresponding eviction filing. ANDEE HOLDENER ET
AL., EVICTION AND HOMELESSNESS IN HENNEPIN COUNTY 22, 24 (2018),
https://www.hennepin.us/-/media/hennepinus/your-government/projectsinitiatives/end-homelessness/humphrey-report-eviction-homelessness-may-2018
.pdf [https://perma.cc/YA64-S2U2] (noting the findings only represent those who
accessed county shelters—and does not include individuals who used shelters
operated by churches or nonprofits or who chose to live with friends or family rather
than enter a shelter).
11. THE GOVERNOR’S TASK FORCE ON HOUSING, MORE PLACES TO CALL HOME:
INVESTING IN MINNESOTA’S FUTURE 30 (2018), http://mn.gov/gov-stat/pdf
/Housing%20Task%20Force%20Report_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/DXN2-HNHB]
.
12. E.g., Roger Moss, Conflict Intervention Service: How an Innovative Mediation
Program Prevents Evictions, S.F. ATT’Y MAG., Fall 2018, at 22, 26,
https://blog.sfbar.org/2018/09/26/conflict-intervention-service-how-an-innovativemediation-program-prevents-evictions/ [https://perma.cc/2RGN-C5FT]; Michelle
Bruch, Mediators Tackle Fast-Paced Evictions, SOUTHWEST J. (Apr. 3, 2018),
http://www.southwestjournal.com/news/2018/04/mediators-tackle-fast-pacedevictions [https://perma.cc/J635-ECPX].
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Mediators act as neutral intermediaries who assist opposing parties
in reaching a settlement.13 Rather than participate in an
adversarial eviction process with the goal of removing the tenant,
mediation is a conflict resolution tool that can prevent eviction by
allowing both parties to engage in negotiation of an agreement
under the guidance of a trained neutral party.14 However, the power
imbalance between landlords and tenants creates obstacles to full
participation in mediation.15 Mediation will only perpetuate the
social ills of eviction if it cannot overcome this power imbalance. 16
Barriers to full participation in mediation by both parties threaten
the use and effectiveness of mediation,17 and existing tenant
protections under the law may be thwarted if tenants are unaware
of their rights.18
This Note will evaluate mediation as an eviction prevention
tool and provide recommendations to address power imbalance in
eviction mediation. Part I of this Note will examine the state of
eviction in Minnesota by reviewing empirical studies of evictions in
the state. Part II will provide an overview of eviction mediation
efforts in Minnesota. Part III will discuss issues of power and
inequality in mediation. Part IV will outline recommendations to
address the power imbalance in mediation between landlords and
tenants in eviction disputes and recommend a statutory pre-filing
mediation process. To create more equitable and successful
mediated settlements in landlord-tenant disputes, Minnesota must
1) eliminate systemic obstacles to negotiation by limiting access to
13. MINN. STAT. § 572.33, subd. 2 (2019) (defining a mediator as “a third party
with no formal coercive power whose function is to promote and facilitate a voluntary
settlement of a controversy identified in an agreement to mediate.”); MINN. GEN. R.
PRAC. 114.02(a)(7) (2019) (“[In mediation] a neutral third party facilitates
communication between parties to promote settlement.”).
14. Mediation
Services
in
Minnesota,
CMTY.
MEDIATION
MINN.
https://communitymediationmn.org/services/mediation [https://perma.cc/CXB6-SJC
N].
15. Claire Baylis & Robyn Carroll, The Nature and Importance of Mechanisms
for Addressing Power Differences in Statutory Mediation, 14 BOND L. REV. 285, 291–
93 (2002); see also Carol J. King, Are Justice and Harmony Mutually Exclusive? A
Response to Professor Nader, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 65, 88–89 (1994) (stating
that those unable to hire attorneys are at a great disadvantage and landlord-tenant
cases involve inherent power imbalances).
16. Baylis & Carroll, supra note 15, at 291–93.
17. Id.
18. See Joel Kurtzberg & Jamie Henikoff, Freeing the Parties from the Law:
Designing an Interest and Rights Focused Model of Landlord/Tenant Mediation,
1997 J. DISP. RESOL. 53, 90–91 (1997) (arguing that the Harvard Mediation
Program’s policy which does not allow mediators to substantively discuss the law
with parties favors knowledgeable parties).
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unlawful detainer records, 2) empower tenants to negotiate through
access to pre-filing mediation, 3) incentivize landlords to mediate by
instituting a notice requirement prior to eviction filing, 4) facilitate
tenant access to existing tenant protections under the law within
the mediation process, and 5) create a statutory eviction mediation
process to ensure tenants receive equal opportunity to mediate.
I. The State of Eviction in Minnesota
In 2017, over 16,000 eviction cases were filed in Minnesota
courts.19 The formal court process of eviction is governed by state
law under Minnesota Statutes §§ 504B.281–.371. In addition to
eviction actions, some landlords also use informal evictions. 20 A
landlord may initiate an eviction action against a tenant on several
grounds: nonpayment of rent,21 holdover,22 breach of lease,23 or
breach of the covenants set forth in Minnesota Statutes §
504B.171.24 Eviction complaints are filed in state district court.25
From there the eviction court process moves quickly, proceeding
from court summons to a hearing within seven to fourteen days. 26
Due to the high volume of filings in Hennepin and Ramsey
counties,27 the district courts serving these counties have
specialized housing court divisions to oversee eviction proceedings,
which are presided over by referees who are subject to judicial
review.28
Once an eviction action is filed, the eviction immediately
places an unlawful detainer on the tenant’s record, regardless of the
merit of the filing, a favorable resolution for the tenant, or any later
19. SAMUEL SPAID, HOME LINE, EVICTIONS IN GREATER MINNESOTA 2 (2018)
[hereinafter GREATER MINNESOTA].
20. Id. at 4. However, the eviction studies discussed in this section apply to
formal evictions.
21. MINN. STAT. § 504B.285, subd. 1(a)(2) (2019).
22. Id. subd. 1(a)(1) (permitting a landlord to commence an eviction action when
a tenant remains in possession of rental property after termination of the tenancy).
23. Id. subd. 1(b).
24. MINN. STAT. § 504B.171 (2019) (prohibiting certain criminal and drug related
activity).
25. MINN. STAT. § 504B.321 (2019).
26. Id.; Luke Grundman et al., In Eviction Proceedings, Lawyers = Better
Outcomes, BENCH & B. (Feb. 5, 2019), http://mnbenchbar.com/2019/02/in-evictionproceedings-lawyers-better-outcomes/ [https://perma.cc/5TTF-PQ4B].
27. In 2017, over 16,000 evictions were filed in Minnesota, and nearly 8,000
occurred in Hennepin and Ramsey counties. GREATER MINNESOTA, supra note 19, at
2, app. 4–5.
28. MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 601–12 (2019).
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agreement between the parties. 29 Seeking to shed light on the
human story of eviction, Dr. Brittany Lewis and the Center for
Urban and Regional Affairs published in-depth research on the
state of eviction in North Minneapolis, examining tenants’
experiences with eviction and difficulties obtaining housing as a
result of their eviction histories. 30 An unlawful detainer has a
substantial negative effect on a tenant’s ability to secure housing
and impacts many tenants who were never subject to an eviction
judgment.31 The appearance of an unlawful detainer on a tenant
screening report frequently results in denied applications for
housing, contributing to homelessness and housing instability for
tenants shut out of the housing market. 32 To improve one’s ability
to find new housing, a tenant may pursue expungement of the
eviction filing.33 Eviction expungement allows removal of unlawful
detainer records from public access—and from tenant screening
company databases.34
In 2016, the City of Minneapolis partnered with HOME Line
and HousingLink to conduct a study of the city’s evictions.35 HOME
Line has followed up on this study with similar in-depth reports on
evictions in greater Minnesota,36 the City of Brooklyn Park,37 and
the City of St. Paul.38 Results from these studies provide data on

29. Grundman, supra note 26; Paula A. Franzese, A Place to Call Home: Tenant
Blacklisting and the Denial of Opportunity, 45 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 661, 663, 667
(2018).
30. BRITTANY LEWIS, THE ILLUSION OF CHOICE: EVICTIONS AND PROFIT IN NORTH
MINNEAPOLIS 6–12 (2019).
31. Id. at 7 (41 of the 68 tenants interviewed—60%—stated unlawful detainers
were an obstacle to obtaining housing; 28 of the 48 tenants who were displaced due
to eviction—58%—were homeless at the time of their interview); Franzese, supra
note 29, at 663.
32. Franzese, supra note 29, at 663.
33. In Minnesota, there are both statutory and common law bases for
expungement of eviction records. MINN. STAT. § 484.014 (2019); State v. C.A., 304
N.W.2d 353, 358 (Minn. 1981) (holding courts may expunge eviction cases under
their inherent authority power if “expungement will yield a benefit to the petitioner
commensurate with the disadvantages to the public from the elimination of the
record and the burden on the court in issuing, enforcing and monitoring an
expungement order.”).
34. MINN. STAT. § 504B.241, subd. 4 (2019).
35. MINNEAPOLIS INNOVATION TEAM, EVICTIONS IN MINNEAPOLIS (2016)
[hereinafter MINNEAPOLIS].
36. GREATER MINNESOTA, supra note 19.
37. SAMUEL SPAID & REBECCA HARE, HOME LINE, EVICTIONS IN BROOKLYN
PARK (2018) [hereinafter BROOKLYN PARK].
38. REBECCA HARE & SAMUEL SPAID, HOME LINE, EVICTIONS IN SAINT PAUL
(2018) [hereinafter SAINT PAUL].
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tenant displacement,39 average amount owed, settlement rates, 40
and tenant appearances,41 among other measures. Across the four
studies, tenants were displaced in 53%–80% of cases;42 at eviction
filing, tenants owed $1,500–$2,000 on average;43 tenants resolved
their eviction case through settlement or by agreement in 30%–69%
of cases;44 and tenants appeared in court in 56%–67% of cases.45
HOME Line’s eviction studies of Minneapolis and St. Paul
offer insight into the eviction patterns of Hennepin and Ramsey
counties, respectively, which combined accounted for nearly half of
all evictions in Minnesota in 2017. 46 The eviction patterns in these
two counties differ in significant ways from those in greater
Minnesota. One key difference was higher settlement rates in the

39. Tenant displacement rates reflect eviction actions resulting in a tenant’s
forced move, which include cases resulting in an eviction judgment, writ of recovery,
or settlement with a move-out agreement. E.g., BROOKLYN PARK, supra note 37, at
11.
40. E.g., id. Settlement rates only reflect settlements in eviction actions where
this information was entered into the court docket and do not reflect informal
agreements occurring outside of the court process. Id. at 9 (explaining study
methodology).
41. E.g., id. at 14–15. Appearance rates—how often a party came for their
scheduled court appearance—were calculated for both landlords and tenants.
42. Tenant displacement rates were 66% in Minneapolis, 53% in Brooklyn Park,
62% in St. Paul, and 80% in greater Minnesota. MINNEAPOLIS, supra note 35, at 8;
BROOKLYN PARK, supra note 37; SAINT PAUL, supra note 38, at 10; GREATER
MINNESOTA, supra note 19, at 9.
43. On average tenants owed <$2000, or 2 months’ rent in Minneapolis, $1600,
or 1.75 months’ rent in Brooklyn Park, $2000, or 2.25 months’ rent in St. Paul, and
$1500, or 3 months’ rent in greater Minnesota. This number reflects the landlord’s
alleged amount owed in the complaint, which includes approximately $300 in court
costs, so the actual amount of rent owed to the landlord is lower. MINNEAPOLIS, supra
note 35, at 7; BROOKLYN PARK, supra note 37, at 9; SAINT PAUL, supra note 38, at 10;
GREATER MINNESOTA, supra note 19, at 9.
44. In Minneapolis, 64% of cases were resolved by agreement at or before the
hearing. MINNEAPOLIS, supra note 35, at 8 (out of 174 cases, 96 settled and 15 were
resolved at or before a hearing without a court order). Both Brooklyn Park and St.
Paul had 69% of cases resolve by agreement of the parties without a court order.
BROOKLYN PARK, supra note 37, at 11 (out of 200 cases, 120 settled and 17 were
resolved before a hearing); SAINT PAUL, supra note 38, at 11 (out of 200 cases, 130
settled and 7 were resolved before the hearing). In greater Minnesota, the number
of cases resolved by agreement were much lower—only 32%. GREATER MINNESOTA,
supra note 19, at 10 (out of 213 cases, 43 settled and 21 were resolved by the parties
before a hearing).
45. Tenant appearance rates were 66% in Minneapolis, 62% in Brooklyn Park,
67% in St. Paul, and 56% in greater Minnesota. MINNEAPOLIS, supra note 35, at 11;
BROOKLYN PARK, supra note 37, at 9; SAINT PAUL, supra note 38, at 10; GREATER
MINNESOTA, supra note 19, at 9.
46. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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metro area compared to greater Minnesota.47 Looking only at cases
where both parties appeared at the eviction hearing, settlement
rates in Minneapolis, St. Paul, and Brooklyn Park are remarkably
higher. In all three studies, when both parties appeared, settlement
rates were above 80%,48 compared to 38% in the greater Minnesota
study.49 One possible explanation is the emphasis placed on
settlement at the eviction hearing in Hennepin and Ramsey
counties.50
Other differences between greater Minnesota and the metro
area offer another side of the story. The greater Minnesota report
highlights the stark difference in eviction rates between
Minneapolis and outstate Minnesota with rates of 3.3% and 1.6%,
respectively.51 According to the report, “[r]educing the metro county
eviction rate to the Greater Minnesota eviction rate for that threeyear time period would have reduced the number of evictions by
18,978—a 38% reduction in total evictions [sic] filings.”52 Two
notable differences between the greater Minnesota report and
metro area studies contribute to understanding the lower number
of filings outstate: a longer length of time prior to eviction filing 53
and a higher likelihood of displacement following eviction filing. 54
47. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
48. In the Minneapolis study, 83% of cases settled when both parties appeared.
MINNEAPOLIS, supra note 35, at 11. Settlement rates were even higher in St. Paul
where 89% of cases settled and in Brooklyn Park where 95% settled when both
parties appeared. SAINT PAUL, supra note 38, at 14; BROOKLYN PARK, supra note 37,
at 14.
49. GREATER MINNESOTA, supra note 19, at 13.
50. KATHERINE ZERWAS & PAUL BIRNBERG, HOME LINE, DUE PROCESS DENIED:
HANDLING OF EVICTION CASES AT THE ANOKA AND DAKOTA COUNTY COURTS 13–14
(2011) [hereinafter DUE PROCESS DENIED], https://homelinemn.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/12/Due-Process-Denied-Anoka-Dakota-Full-Draft-11Corrected-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/G3M2-M4GZ] (“Hennepin County employs
mediators and has made a concerted effort to encourage settlement—not only using
trained mediators, but having clerks and referees urging settlement, and employing
a con[s]istent approach to cases by the court.”); SECOND JUDICIAL DIST. OF MINN.
HOUS. COURT, REPORT OF OPPORTUNITIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 5–7 (2017).
51. GREATER MINNESOTA, supra note 19, at 6 (“The Eviction Rate was calculated
by taking the number of evictions in a given area and dividing that number by the
number of rental units in the same given area as reported by the American
Community Survey.”).
52. GREATER MINNESOTA, supra note 19, at 6. Id.
53. In greater Minnesota, landlords filed for eviction when tenants were about 3
months behind in rent, compared to 1.75–2.25 months in the metro area studies. See
supra note 43 and accompanying text.
54. Greater Minnesota had an 80% displacement rate following eviction filing,
compared to 53–66% in the metro area studies. See supra note 42 and accompanying
text.
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One possible explanation for these differences could be that
landlords and tenants are engaging in informal discussions prior to
eviction filing and resolving the issue out of court through payment
plans or move-out agreements, thereby diverting would-be eviction
cases.55 These informal discussions may be possible in part due to
the greater likelihood of a more personal landlord-tenant
relationship than is typical in the metro area, where a small
number of landlords account for a sizeable percentage of overall
eviction filings. Tenants with landlords who are accessible are likely
in a better position to negotiate informal agreements to avoid
eviction.
The theory posited for higher settlement rates in Hennepin
and Ramsey (emphasis on settlement in the court process) and the
theory explaining lower eviction rates in greater Minnesota (more
negotiation is happening outside of court) are two sides of the same
coin. Both theories tell different parts of the same story: negotiation
between landlords and tenants can keep tenants out of court and in
their homes. However, any strategy using these methods to reduce
evictions must tackle the issues of low tenant appearance rates 56
and high settlement failure rates.57 To address these issues, this
Note proposes that a pre-filing mediation program that recognizes
and mitigates power differentials between tenants and landlords
would facilitate full participation by both parties in negotiating
more successful negotiated agreements.
II. Eviction Mediation Practices in Minnesota
Eviction mediation is not a new practice in Minnesota. 58 Metro
area mediation organizations have been serving district courts in
Hennepin and Ramsey counties for decades, staffing their housing
55. A longer time prior to an eviction filing could indicate that discussions were
occurring between landlords and tenants in greater Minnesota when tenants are
behind on rent. The higher likelihood of displacement following an eviction filing
supports this theory; the failure of informal discussions between the parties indicates
that these cases were less likely to be resolved in the tenant’s favor in court.
56. Tenant appearance rates were poor across all four studies, ranging from
56%–67%, and contributed to lower settlement rates and higher rates of
displacement. See sources cited supra note 45.
57. A settlement was categorized as a failure if a writ of recovery was issued
following entry of a settlement agreement. Settlement failure rates were 39% in
Minneapolis and 27% in St. Paul compared to only 7% in greater Minnesota. See
sources cited supra note 42.
58. Linda Mealey-Lohmann & Eduardo Wolle, Pockets of Innovation in
Minnesota’s Alternative Dispute Resolution Journey, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 441,
472–74 (2006).
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calendars with trained volunteer mediators. 59 Many of these same
organizations are also involved in pre-eviction filing mediation and
partner with cities, landlords, and tenant advocacy organizations
across the metro area.60
A. Court-integrated Mediation Services
The Fourth Judicial District Housing Court in Hennepin
County contracts with the Conflict Resolution Center (CRC)61 and
Community Mediation and Restorative Services (CMRS) to staff
volunteer mediators during the housing court calendar. 62 MidMinnesota Legal Aid (MMLA) and Volunteer Lawyers Network
(VLN) also staff attorneys at housing court, who primarily provide
tenants with brief legal advice and may engage in limited scope
representation to advocate for tenants in court or settlement
negotiation.63 In 2017, CRC reported 190 housing court referrals, 64
and CMRS reported 140 housing court referrals, 65 with both

59. Dawn Zugay, Volunteer Manager, Conflict Resolution Ctr., Remarks at
Eviction Crisis: Mediator Training (Sept. 25, 2018); Telephone interview with Anna
Rios, Hous. Project Manager, Dispute Resolution Ctr. (Nov. 15, 2018) (on file with
author).
60. Rios, supra note 59; Telephone interview with Sandra Moberg Walls,
Program Dir., Cmty. Mediation & Restorative Servs. (Nov. 16, 2018) (on file with
author).
61. CRC has mediated over 10,000 eviction cases in over 25 years working in
housing court. CONFLICT RESOLUTION CTR., ANNUAL REPORT 2017 (2017),
http://crcminnesota.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/annualreport2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/642B-HPFC].
62. Conflict Resolution Ctr., FY19 Community Dispute Resolution Program
Grant Application, 15 (2018) [hereinafter CRC Grant Application] (on file with
author); Cmty. Mediation & Restorative Servs., Inc., FY19 Community Dispute
Resolution Program Grant Application, 6 (2018) [hereinafter CMRS Grant
Application] (on file with author).
63. LUKE GRUNDMAN & MURIA KRUGER, LEGAL REPRESENTATION IN EVICTIONS:
COMPARATIVE STUDY 3–4 (2018), https://www.minnpost.com/wp-content/uploads
/2018/11/2018-Eviction-Representation-Results-Study-with-logos.pdf [https://perma
.cc/2EEB-LJB8].
64. CRC Grant Application, supra note 61, app. 1, at 19. In 2018, 84% of
community housing mediations resulted in a mediated agreement and 73% of
housing court mediations resulted in agreements. Email from Dawn Zugay, Program
& Volunteer Manager, Conflict Resolution Ctr., to Rebecca Hare, author (Sept. 11,
2019).
65. CMRS reports that 60% of all their mediated cases resulted in an agreement
in 2017. CMRS Grant Application, supra note 62, app. 1, at 22 (reporting 365 out of
611 mediated cases in 2017 resulted in agreements). However, note that this data
represents all mediations and is not data specific to landlord-tenant mediated cases.
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organizations averaging a combined total of 27.5 mediations in
housing court per month.66
The Dispute Resolution Center (DRC) has been working in the
Second Judicial District Housing Court in Ramsey County for over
20 years, reliably staffing volunteer mediators during the housing
court calendar.67 Mediators work alongside volunteer attorneys
from VLN and Southern Minnesota Regional Legal Services
(SMRLS) and Emergency Assistance workers, so tenants have
access to the legal and financial resources they need to mediate
effectively.68 This arrangement “empowers both the landlord and
tenant to talk with each other.”69 Attorneys provide brief advice to
prepare tenants to negotiate with an understanding of applicable
law, and Emergency Assistance workers provide assurance to
landlords that tenants will have funds available to fulfill their
settlement obligations.70 In 2017, DRC mediated 14 cases in
housing court and 20 housing cases in the community.71
In 2017, the Second Judicial District Housing Court formed a
workgroup to produce a report on recommendations for the court to
improve access to legal, financial, and social services for tenants
and landlords.72 Priority recommendations related to mediation
included 1) announcing that mediators are available at the
beginning of first appearances, 2) encouraging attorney
representation in mediation to avoid a power imbalance, 3) starting
a pilot mediation program where the judge may order parties to
mediate before or at their first appearance, and 4) encouraging prefiling mediation.73 DRC launched a pilot program in July 2018 to
address the issues cited in this report with a special focus on
increasing pre-filing mediation.74

66. CRC Grant Application, supra note 62, app. 1, at 19; CMRS Grant
Application, supra note 62, app. 1, at 22.
67. Rios, supra note 59.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Dispute Resolution Ctr., FY19 Community Dispute Resolution Program
Grant Application, app. 1 (2018) [hereinafter “DRC Grant Application”]. DRC reports
that 80% of their eviction mediations result in agreements. Compare Rios, supra note
59, with DRC Grant Application, supra note 71, app. 1 (reporting 90 of 192 all
mediated cases in 2017—or 47%—resulted in an agreement).
72. SECOND JUDICIAL DIST. OF MINN. HOUS. COURT, supra note 50, at 2.
73. Id. at 5–7.
74. Rios, supra note 59.
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B. Pre-filing Eviction Mediation Programs
Minnesota courts and mediation programs recognize the
benefits of pre-filing mediation, with most programs offering
mediation services prior to eviction filing “to avoid involvement in
the courts and the devastating social costs of eviction on families.” 75
Outreach to landlords is a critical part of this process as well as
communicating incentives for landlords to mediate. 76 To start prefiling programs, mediation organizations cultivate relationships
with cities, landlords, housing organizations, and courts and raise
awareness of their services within the community. 77 For example,
Aeon, a large affordable housing developer, has been working with
several mediation programs to offer pre-filing mediation in its
buildings throughout Hennepin, Ramsey, and Anoka counties. 78
Some companies, such as CommonBond Communities, have even
created their own eviction prevention programs.79
CRC and CMRS began a joint pre-eviction filing mediation
program in 2017 through a grant from the McKnight Foundation
with a goal “to begin to change the dialogue [by] moving housing
court mediations upstream to occur prior to an eviction filing.” 80
Through this intentional expansion into pre-filing mediation, the
organizations were focused on preventing homelessness, and in the
following year, expanded their partnership to include DRC and
Mediation Services for Anoka County (MSAC).81 CRC is working to
expand its pre-filing program by reaching out directly to landlords
and tenants to start mediation prior to eviction filing, leveraging its
referral partnership with MMLA, and incorporating remote
technology to reach more potential mediation participants
throughout the state.82
CMRS offers mediation at any stage of conflict between
tenants and landlords and has operated both eviction and pre-filing
75. CRC Grant Application, supra note 62, at 15–16 (discussing a joint grant
request with CMRS, DRC, and MSAC to provide pre-filing mediation services to
tenants and landlords and a long-term strategy to expand housing mediation
services statewide using remote technology).
76. Rios, supra note 59.
77. Id.; Moberg Walls, supra note 60.
78. Rios, supra note 59.
79. Alicia Cordes-Mayo, Eviction Prevention: It’s at the Heart of Our Work,
COMMONBOND CMTYS. (Oct. 16, 2018), https://commonbond.org/eviction-prevention
[https://perma.cc/3T2G-AQVZ].
80. CRC Grant Application, supra note 62, at 16.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 15.
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programs for over 20 years.83 From 2017 to 2018, CMRS has
increased their focus on pre-filing eviction and expanded from 4 to
55 pre-eviction filing referrals.84 CMRS has built mediation
relationships with over a dozen cities in Hennepin County and
continues to develop relationships with individual large and small
landlords as well as tenant organizations. 85 CMRS strives to “open
up an area for both [landlords and tenants] to feel more
approachable and to feel that everything is happening in good
faith.”86 To create this space, CMRS offers both traditional face-toface mediation as well as telephonic and electronic mediation
models.87 The alternative models can diffuse anger, and private
caucusing in face-to-face mediation can allow for reality-checking
with both parties.88 A unique aspect of CMRS’s model is its
emphasis on follow-up after the parties have reached a mediated
agreement.89 By including follow-up as part of their process, they
are able to support the tenant as they complete their payment plan
and monitor the success of their mediated agreements. 90 CMRS has
been able to achieve an incredible amount of success by linking
tenants to resources through Emergency Assistance and other
funding sources.91 In 2018, only 3 of 210 pre-filing mediation cases
involving referrals to financial resources resulted in evictions. 92
Other eviction mediation programs in the state operating prefiling mediation programs include MSAC, Rice County Dispute
Resolution Program, Mediation and Conflict Solutions (MCS),
which serves Rochester and southeastern Minnesota, 93 and Lakes
& Prairies Community Action Partnership, which serves incomeeligible residents of Clay and Wilkin counties.94 In 2017, MSAC
83. Moberg Walls, supra note 60.
84. CMRS Grant Application, supra note 62, at 5 (highlighting pre-filing
mediation figures from Apr. 1, 2017 and Apr. 1, 2018, respectively).
85. Id. at 15 (“[I]n 2017 referrals came from 67 different referral sources
(entities - not individuals) with participants from at least 85 cities.”); Moberg Walls,
supra note 60.
86. Moberg Walls, supra note 60.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Mediation & Conflict Sols., FY19 Community Dispute Resolution Program
Grant Application, 9 (2018) [hereinafter MCS Grant Application].
94. Rental
Registration,
CITY
OF
MOORHEAD,
http://www.cityofmoorhead.com/departments/planning-and-neighborhood-
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mediated 8 landlord-tenant cases and has since expanded their
housing mediation program to work directly with landlords to
provide increased mediation services.95 Lakes & Prairies’ program
also provides a variety of services, including financial assistance
with rental costs, for families in crisis.96
III. Issues of Power and Inequality in Mediation
Mediation advocates view mediation as an “opportunity to
come up with decisions together” by “putting power back in the
hands of people.”97 Mediators do not pass judgment on a dispute;
their role as a neutral arbiter is to aid both parties in reaching a
consensual outcome.98 Neutrality, self-determination, and
consensual decision making are central tenets of the mediation
process. Yet these values come into tension with one another when
a power imbalance exists between the parties in dispute: “The ongoing difficulty, in both the theory and practice of mediation, is that
there can be a contradiction between even-handedness and fairness:
if the parties are treated in the same way, then power differentials
are not addressed, leading to a lack of fairness in process and
outcome.”99 While mediation can be a tool of empowerment, it can
perpetuate inequality if it is not implemented with conditions that
empower both parties.100

services/rental-registration [https://perma.cc/D3CQ-VM7C].
95. Mediation Servs. for Anoka County, FY19 Grant Application, Community
Dispute Resolution Program, 9 (2018) [hereinafter MSAC Grant Application].
96. Housing Stability, LAKES & PRAIRIES CMTY. ACTION P’SHIP,
http://www.lakesandprairies.net/html/fcs_housing_programs.html [https://perma.cc
/6XNV-2G2K].
97. Rios, supra note 59.
98. MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 114.02(a)(7) (2019) (“A mediator may not impose his or
her own judgment on the issues for that of the parties.”). Depending on the
jurisdiction, mediators may exert more influence and power over the parties in
settlement; for example, in Massachusetts, mediators known as “Housing
Specialists” have the “power to inspect housing units, call non-present witnesses for
clarification, predict judicial outcomes, suggest settlement terms to the parties, and
answer procedural/substantive questions of the litigants. John Pollock, Recent
Studies Compare Full Representation to Limited Assistance in Eviction Cases, 42
HOUSING L. BULL. 72, 77 (2012). “Unless parties stood extremely firm in the
‘mediation’ sessions, the Housing Specialists came close to serving as adjudicators
with inquisitorial powers.” Id. at 77 n.24.
99. Baylis & Carroll, supra note 15, at 293.
100. While power imbalances may affect both interaction between the parties and
the parties’ interaction with the mediator, this Note focuses on the former power
dynamic. Baylis & Carroll, supra note 15, at 288.
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The power dynamics of eviction present unique obstacles to
equitable and, ultimately, successful settlements. Both before and
after an eviction is filed, tenants occupy a position of low negotiating
power.101 Tenants are frequently intimidated by the threat of
eviction from their home, loss of a public subsidy due to eviction, 102
or the risk of incurring the blackmark of eviction on their housing
record.103 When eviction is exercised at the option of a landlord, it
places the tenant in a defensive position in an adversarial process
that only intensifies these concerns over equal negotiation power.
In a state that does not guarantee an attorney in eviction cases,
tenants facing eviction also have a significant disadvantage in
enforcing their rights in negotiations and in court. 104
Under Minnesota General Rules of Practice 114.13(a)(2),
mediators must be trained in power balancing. 105 Mediators employ
numerous methods to reduce power imbalances, including private
caucusing, managing expectations, and using a neutral setting. 106
These strategies can also be applied to mediation between landlords
and tenants. For example, a mediator may meet with a tenant
separately in a private caucus setting to develop realistic budgetary

101. Franzese, supra note 29, at 672 (arguing the threat of an unlawful detainer
on their record dissuades tenants from asserting their rights); Kim Barker & Jessica
Silver-Greenberg, On Tenant Blacklist, Errors and Renters with Little Recourse, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 16, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/17/nyregion/new-yorkhousing-tenant-blacklist.html [https://perma.cc/5NLJ-9BFM].
102. The agency is required to terminate the subsidy if the tenant was evicted “for
serious violation of the lease” and may permissively terminate in other
circumstances. 24 C.F.R. §§ 982.551–.553; see also LAWRENCE MCDONOUGH,
RESIDENTIAL EVICTION DEFENSE AND TENANT CLAIMS IN MINNESOTA, ch. VI.F.10.a.
(6) (16th ed., Jan. 2019), http://povertylaw.homestead.com/files/Reading/Resi
dential_Eviction_Defense_in_Minnesota.htm
[https://perma.cc/A9TX-872M]
(discussing subsidy termination cases in Minnesota).
103. Robert R. Stauffer, Tenant Blacklisting: Tenant Screening Services and the
Right to Privacy, 24 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 239, 267 (1987) (“Where tenants are aware
of the screening service, they may be inhibited from exercising their legal rights in
the first place. They may refrain from taking legal action in response to illegal
conduct by their landlords, and may go to great lengths to settle any conflict out of
court, to prevent the landlord from filing the initial suit.”).
104. GRUNDMAN & KRUGER, supra note 63, at 1–2 (“Fully represented tenants win
or settle their cases 96% of the time, clients receiving limited/brief services win or
settle 83% of the time, and those without any legal services win or settle only 62% of
the time . . . . Unrepresented tenants are between four and five times more likely
than fully represented tenants to face the . . . abrupt, forced departure from their
homes by sheriff deputies.”).
105. MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 114.13(a)(2) (2019).
106. Baylis & Carroll, supra note 15, at 293–96 (offering an extensive list of both
features of the mediation process and mediator interventions and strategies that can
reduce power differentials).
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goals to keep the tenant from agreeing to an impossible payment
plan.107 To equalize the inherent power imbalance, the mediator
may also review the case for technical defects and privately caucus
with the landlord to manage their expectations of success in
court.108 Pre-filing mediation also allows the parties to meet in a
more neutral setting than court and engage in conflict resolution
rather than the adversarial eviction process. 109
However, despite the best efforts and intentions of mediators,
inequality in the landlord-tenant relationship persists in mediation.
Tenants face obstacles to effective negotiation when landlords have
little incentive to negotiate outside of court. Instead, many
landlords prefer operating in a system that allows them to process
evictions quickly and conveniently110 with a reasonable likelihood
of a judgment in favor of the landlord’s possession when the tenant
does not appear for the eviction hearing. 111 The tenant’s position of
low negotiation power combined with lack of legal representation 112
raises additional concerns:
Unrepresented parties might not understand how mediation
operates, how it fits into the overall litigation process, or its
potential advantages or disadvantages when deciding whether
or how to use mediation. Unrepresented parties might not be
able to articulate or express their views or concerns during
mediation . . . . Unrepresented parties might view the mediator
as a court authority and feel pressured to settle . . . .
Unrepresented parties also might not have enough factual or
107. Zugay, supra note 59; Moberg Walls, supra note 60.
108. See sources cited supra note 107.
109. See sources cited supra note 107.
110. Bill Hudson, Cameras Capture the Fast Pace of Minn. Housing Court, WCCO
(May 23, 2012), https://minnesota.cbslocal.com/2012/05/23/cameras-capture-thefast-pace-of-minn-housing-court [https://perma.cc/K3MC-MD85].
111. MINNEAPOLIS, supra note 35, at 12 (76% resulted in court writs); GREATER
MINNESOTA, supra note 19, at 14 (57% resulted in writs); BROOKLYN PARK, supra
note 37, at 15 (45% resulted in writs); SAINT PAUL, supra note 38, at 15 (52% resulted
in writs).
112. In all four studies, tenants had extremely low levels of representation.
Comparatively, landlords had a significantly higher rate of representation, either by
an attorney or power of authority. MINNEAPOLIS, supra note 35, at 12 (finding that
78% of landlords were represented by an attorney or power of authority, compared
to only 2% of tenants); GREATER MINNESOTA, supra note 19, at 14 (finding that 60%
of landlords were represented by an attorney or power of authority, compared to only
5% of tenants); BROOKLYN PARK, supra note 37, at 15–16 (finding that 92% of
landlords were represented by an attorney or power of authority, compared to fewer
than 1% of tenants); SAINT PAUL, supra note 38, at 15–16 (finding that 82% of
landlords were represented by an attorney or power of authority, compared to only
5% of tenants).
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legal information to evaluate the implications of settlement
proposals in order to make a fully informed decision and, as a
consequence, might accept a settlement that is unfair or does
not adequately address their interests.113

While both housing attorneys and volunteer attorneys staff
the housing court calendar to provide brief advice to tenants
without representation, this advice may not always be sufficient to
address these issues.
IV. Equalizing Power Imbalances in Mediation
Addressing power dynamics in mediation is essential to
effective eviction prevention. For mediation to work effectively in
landlord-tenant disputes, the eviction court process must eliminate
systemic obstacles to negotiation, empower tenants to mediate,
incentivize landlords to participate in mediation, and ensure the
legal rights of tenants are protected in the mediation process.
A. Unlawful Detainer Disclosure and Classification Reform:
Eliminating Systemic Obstacles to Negotiation
Landlords wield significant power over tenants with the threat
of filing an eviction since the mere act of filing indiscriminately
places an unlawful detainer on a tenant’s record, regardless of the
merit of the case.114 For many, an unlawful detainer poses a nearly
insurmountable barrier to future housing. 115 Limiting access to
eviction records that inaccurately and unfairly allow a landlord to
blackmark a tenant is essential to eliminating systemic obstacles to
negotiation and empowering tenants to mediate. Eliminating this
power imbalance on a systemic level could increase tenant
participation in negotiation by improving confidence in the court
process and providing incentive to settle in mediation to prevent the
unlawful detainer designation. It could also reduce the use of
meritless eviction filing as a retaliatory measure by landlords
seeking to blackmark a particular tenant.
While the expungement process appears to solve this issue by
providing an avenue to clear the housing records of unfairly
blackmarked tenants, its benefits are limited. Expungement

113. Roselle L. Wissler, Representation in Mediation: What We Know from
Empirical Research, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 419, 424 (Feb. 2010).
114. MINN. STAT. § 484.014, subd. 1(2) (2019).
115. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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operates on an individual, ad hoc basis and does not begin to reach
all of the cases that would likely merit expungement if applied as a
uniform rule. Tenants must be aware of the eviction on their record
as well as the expungement process in order to commence
expungement since the process must be initiated by the tenant. 116
Expungement also does not address the immediate entry of an
unlawful detainer on the tenant’s record, 117 and it does nothing to
restore the lack of confidence in the court and the eviction process
among tenants blackmarked before their case has been decided on
its merits. For these reasons, restricting eviction record access by
disposition is necessary to address the inefficacies of eviction
expungement and eliminate obstacles to tenant participation in
negotiation.
Other states already limit eviction reporting by statute. For
example, in California, housing records may only be disclosed under
specific circumstances to prevent the unfair impact on tenants who
redeemed, prevailed, or settled their cases.118 Bills have been
proposed in both the Minnesota Senate and Minnesota House of
Representatives to mandate expungement:
[I]f the defendant prevailed on the merits; [] if the court
dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint for any reason; [] if the
parties to the action have agreed to an expungement; or [] upon
motion of a defendant, if the case is settled and the defendant
fulfills the terms of the settlement.119

The bills also classify certain eviction records as nonpublic
data, so that “[a]n eviction action is not accessible to the public until
the court enters a final judgment . . . .”120 Opponents of expanding
eviction expungement argue that it prevents landlords from
accessing information essential to their tenant screening process.121
However, the types of cases encompassed by these
recommendations are prime examples of cases where there is not

116. MINN. STAT. § 484.014, subd. 2 (2019) (“The court may order expungement of
an eviction case court file only upon motion of a defendant . . . .”).
117. Only 6% of unrepresented tenants leave court with their eviction expunged
from their record, compared to 78% of represented tenants. Luke Grundman et al.,
supra note 26, at tbl. 5.
118. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1161.2 (2018).
119. H. F. 1511, 2019 Leg., 91st Sess. (Minn. 2019); S. F. 1751, 2019 Leg., 91st
Sess. (Minn. 2019).
120. H. F. 1511; S. F. 1751.
121. E.g., LEWIS, supra note 30, at 53.
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significant public interest in the record. Prospective landlords have
little interest in knowing about pending cases because the court has
not determined whether there was merit to the eviction filing, and
landlords have even less interest if the case was resolved in favor of
the tenant. In the case of settlement, prospective landlords also
have reduced interest because the parties negotiated an agreement
and the merits of the case were never determined by a court. In
addition, the argument against expanding expungement also
ignores expungement’s critical consideration of the public’s interest
in knowing about the record, not landlords’ interests. 122 The broader
public has little interest in eviction cases generally, and whatever
interest the public has pales in comparison to the interests of justice
that are advanced in expungement—enabling tenants to secure
housing for themselves and their families. 123
In addition to pursuing legislative measures to expand
expungement, the Governor’s Task Force on Housing has
recommended that courts “[l]imit eviction reporting until a court
judgment is rendered [by exploring] the viability of maintaining the
confidentiality of Housing Court eviction filings until cases are
determined on their merits.”124 The Minnesota Supreme Court also
has several avenues it could take to reduce the negative impact of
indiscriminate unlawful detainer classifications. For example, the
Court could revise their record retention schedule to designate no
retention period for unlawful detainer actions dismissed or resolved
in favor of the tenant defendant.125 As another possibility, the Court
could change the public access rules to eliminate access to pending
unlawful detainer actions, eliminate the default entry of the
unlawful detainer designation in eviction cases, and limit access to
dismissed cases and those decided in favor of the tenant defendant
in the eviction action.126 Alternatively, the Court could also create
122. MINN. STAT. § 484.014, subd. 2 (2019) (“The court may order expungement of
an eviction case court file . . . if the court finds that the plaintiff’s case is sufficiently
without basis in fact or law . . . that expungement is clearly in the interests of justice
and those interests are not outweighed by the public’s interest in knowing about the
record.”).
123. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
124. GOVERNOR’S TASK FORCE ON HOUS., supra note 11, at 32.
125. See Minn. Dist. Ct. Record Retention Schedule 11(e) (2018),
http://www.mncourts.gov/mncourtsgov/media/scao_library/MN-District-CourtRecord-Retention-Schedule.pdf [https://perma.cc/6S9R-86W6].
126. See MINN. R. PUB. ACCESS TO REC. OF THE JUDICIAL BRANCH 8, subd. 2(c)
(2017) (limiting public access to pending criminal cases searched using a case party
name); MINN. R. PUB. ACCESS TO REC. OF THE JUDICIAL BRANCH 8, subd. 2(g) (2017)
(allowing remote access to unlawful detainer cases); MINN. R. PUB. ACCESS TO REC.
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additional requirements for entities receiving bulk distribution of
records under their access agreement. 127 The Court could require
recipients of bulk eviction record data intended for distribution to
report disposition information. This would require tenant screening
companies to provide appropriate context for a tenant’s eviction
record and allow future landlords reviewing a tenant’s rental
application to evaluate the significance of an unlawful detainer on
the basis of its disposition.
Restricting access to unlawful detainer information would
improve tenants’ ability to participate in mediation and increase the
number of successful mediated agreements. When settlements do
not appear as an unlawful detainer on their record, tenants are in
a better position to negotiate and have incentive to reach an
achievable agreement128 to avoid an unlawful detainer designation
being placed on their record.129 Tenants would also have more
freedom to negotiate move-out agreements; rather than agreeing to
unrealistic payment plans, tenants would be able to negotiate a
move-out with the knowledge they will not be prevented from
obtaining new housing due to an unlawful detainer on their record.
B. Notice and Pre-filing Mediation: Empowering Tenants
and Incentivizing Landlords to Mediate Prior to
Eviction
Minnesota’s eviction process moves very quickly, enticing
landlords to use the court system in circumstances that would

OF THE JUDICIAL BRANCH 8, subd. 3 (2017) (limiting bulk distribution of court records

with remote access limitations under subd. 2).
127. MINN. R. PUB. ACCESS TO REC. OF THE JUDICIAL BRANCH 8, subd. 3(b) (2017).
128. Achievable payment plans are crucial to successful outcomes for tenants and
landlords. A study examining settlements in Brooklyn Park eviction cases found that
settlements were more likely to be successful when they involved smaller payments
of money owed distributed over a longer period of time. SAMUEL SPAID, HOME LINE
& REBECCA HARE, SETTLEMENT SUPPLEMENT TO “EVICTIONS IN BROOKLYN PARK” (on
file with HOME Line). Settlements where tenants agree to make high payments
within a short period of time are not typically realistic and may reflect an agreement
made between unequal parties. Id.
129. To achieve successful settlements and prevent a landlord from coercing a
tenant into accepting an impossible payment plan, a mediator acting as a neutral
party may try to manage expectations and reality check with both parties to ensure
the agreement’s terms are realistically achievable. Baylis & Carroll, supra note 15,
at 293–96 (offering an extensive list of both features of the mediation process and
mediator interventions and strategies that can reduce power differentials); Zugay,
supra note 59; Moberg Walls, supra note 60. But cf. Stauffer, supra note 103, at 267
(“Where tenants are aware of the screening service, they may . . . go to great lengths
to settle any conflict out of court, to prevent the landlord from filing the initial suit.”).
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otherwise be resolved outside of court through negotiation of a
payment plan.130 The majority of eviction actions are for
nonpayment and many result in a payment plan settlement
allowing the tenant to remain in their home. 131 Pre-filing mediation
would simply provide the same opportunity to negotiate a payment
plan without the tenant going to court to defend against an eviction.
It would also prevent the issue of an unlawful detainer entry
discussed above. Mediation prior to eviction filing encourages both
parties to seek a resolution prior to initiating an adversarial court
process and receive assistance from a neutral third party in
reaching an agreement.132 Including a notice requirement prior to
eviction filing, and encouraging mediation during this time, is
necessary to encourage landlord participation in mediation and
ensure the opportunity to negotiate is extended equally to all
tenants.133
Instituting a notice period prior to eviction filing would create
a built-in timeframe to allow pre-filing mediation to take place. A
notice requirement of fourteen days prior to eviction filing would
inform the tenant of a potential eviction action and provide time for
the parties to arrange mediation with a qualified neutral. 134
Because most eviction actions are brought on the grounds of
nonpayment,135 the notice requirement would provide an
130. When both parties appeared, the vast majority of cases settled (83% in
Minneapolis, 95% in Brooklyn Park, and 89% in St. Paul), and of those settlements,
the majority resulted in payment plans (no data provided for Minneapolis, 86% in
Brooklyn Park, and 60% in St. Paul). MINNEAPOLIS, supra note 35, at 8, 11;
BROOKLYN PARK, supra note 37, at 11, 14; SAINT PAUL, supra note 38, at 11, 14.
131. See supra note 130 and accompanying text. Of payment plan settlements, the
rate of successful settlements varied (i.e. a successful settlement was defined as one
that did not result in the issuance of a writ of recovery) (31% in Minneapolis, 64% in
Brooklyn Park, and 67% in St. Paul). MINNEAPOLIS, supra note 35, at 8; BROOKLYN
PARK, supra note 37, at 11; SAINT PAUL, supra note 38, at 11.
132. Moberg Walls, supra note 60 (discussing how the mediator’s role opens up a
space where the both parties feel more approachable and that negotiating is
happening in good faith); Rios, supra note 59 (discussing how pre-filing mediation
empowers both parties to talk with each other).
133. On January 22, 2019, a bill was introduced in the Minnesota Senate that
would require a fourteen-day notice period of a violation prior to filing an eviction.
S. F. 338, 2019 Leg., 91st Sess. (Minn. 2019).
134. The State Court Administrator’s Office publishes a list of qualified neutrals
in Minnesota. MINN. STATEWIDE ADR-RULE 114 NEUTRALS ROSTER,
https://adrroster.courts.state.mn.us/.
135. MINNEAPOLIS, supra note 35, at 9 (finding 164 cases were brought for
nonpayment of 174 cases reviewed); GREATER MINNESOTA, supra note 19, at 11
(finding 190 cases were brought for nonpayment of 213 cases reviewed); BROOKLYN
PARK, supra note 37, at 12 (finding 193 cases were brought for nonpayment of 200
cases reviewed); SAINT PAUL, supra note 38, at 12 (finding 188 cases were brought
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opportunity to negotiate a payment plan outside of court. 136
However, if the parties were unable to achieve a mutually agreed
result in mediation, the landlord would be able to initiate an
eviction action after the time for mediation has passed. 137
Having a notice period would also allow tenants time to secure
financial resources. Tenants experiencing an adverse life event may
not have the resources to agree to a payment plan in mediation
without financial assistance from outside sources, such as
Emergency Assistance. Tenants who apply for Emergency
Assistance may frequently wait up to a month to receive funds to
cover the cost of rent, which is often too late to prevent eviction. 138
Improving accessibility to emergency financial resources has been
identified as a recommendation by the Governor’s Task Force on
Housing.139 Initiatives in both Hennepin and Ramsey counties have
recognized the importance of timely processing of Emergency
Assistance applications and have created partnerships to improve
this process.140 Through these partnerships they are able to connect
tenants to Emergency Assistance for a letter of guarantee on their
behalf, so they have a better position from which to mediate an
agreement.141 In nonpayment cases, having a letter of guarantee
provides assurance to a landlord that the rent owed by the tenant
will be paid and eliminates the need for pursuing an eviction
action.142 The additional time allotted for pre-filing mediation would
allow tenants time to secure these financial resources and allow
both parties reach an agreement without resorting to an eviction
action.
Pre-filing mediation could also improve the tenant’s ability to
make an achievable payment plan because the landlord would not
for nonpayment of 200 cases reviewed).
136. Contra Laura Nader, Controlling Processes in the Practice of Law: Hierarchy
and Pacification in the Movement to Re-form Dispute Ideology, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 1, 12 (1993) (“Mandatory mediation abridges American freedom because it is
often outside the law, eliminates choice of procedure, removes equal protection before
an adversary law, and is generally hidden from view.”).
137. This fourteen-day mediation window would be similar to the existing law
governing rent escrow actions that requires a fourteen-day notification period before
a tenant may pursue a rent escrow action for repairs. MINN. STAT. § 504B.385 (2019).
138. Bruch, supra note 12.
139. GOVERNOR’S TASK FORCE ON HOUS., supra note 11, at 9.
140. LEWIS, supra note 30, at 13; SECOND JUDICIAL DIST. OF MINN. HOUS. COURT,
supra note 50.
141. Rios, supra note 59; Rose McCullough, NorthPoint Health & Wellness Ctr.,
Remarks at Eviction Crisis: Mediator Training (Sept. 25, 2018).
142. See supra note 141.
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be seeking recovery of their costs in pursuing an eviction action. 143
In filing an eviction, landlords bear the costs of “lost rent, vacancy
and turnover costs, and legal fees.” 144 Pre-filing mediation could
reduce these costs and serve the same role as settlement, which
already occurs in the vast majority of cases where tenants appear
at their eviction hearing.145 Pre-filing mediation also offers
landlords incentive to mediate to avoid the costs entailed in
pursuing an eviction action in court and to recover rent that would
otherwise be lost if the tenant were to vacate. 146
Settlement trends in Hennepin and Ramsey counties—which
account for half of all evictions filed in the state 147—do not suggest
that a move towards pre-filing mediation would result in increased
tenant displacement. Settlement rates are high in both Hennepin
and Ramsey counties,148 likely because both courts encourage and
facilitate settlement negotiation as part of their eviction hearing
process.149 Because nonpayment of rent is by far the most common
reason for court-ordered evictions in these jurisdictions, settlements
typically involve creating payment plans, while a smaller
percentage include agreements by the tenant to vacate. 150 These
trends, combined with strategies to mitigate power imbalance in
negotiation, refute the argument that mediation would merely
serve as another avenue for tenant displacement. Landlords who
are already making payment settlements with tenants in court are
unlikely to seek move-out settlements outside of it, particularly
when tenants are motivated to arrange a payment plan. Landlords
remain motivated to seek recovery of the unpaid rent, and

143. Mediators may charge a reasonable fee for their services. MINN. GEN. R.
PRAC. 114.11 (2019).
144. GOVERNOR’S TASK FORCE ON HOUS., supra note 124, at 30.
145. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
146. Moberg Walls, supra note 60.
147. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
148. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
149. DUE PROCESS DENIED, supra note 50; SECOND JUDICIAL DIST. OF MINN.
HOUS. COURT, supra note 50. Both courts include mediators in their housing court
calendars to assist with mediating eviction settlements and are actively pursuing
pre-filing mediation initiatives. Id.
150. E.g., SAINT PAUL, supra note 38, at 11 (finding that 58% of cases settled
resulted in payment plans while 38% resulted in move-out settlements). The results
of the eviction study in Brooklyn Park are less typical because a majority of evictions
in the city are filed by four property owners, that had an unusually high rate of
payment plans. BROOKLYN PARK, supra note 37, at 11 (finding that 83% of cases
settled resulted in payment plans while 13% resulted in move-out settlements);
SAMUEL SPAID, HOME LINE & REBECCA HARE, FREQUENT FILERS SUPPLEMENT TO
“EVICTIONS IN BROOKLYN PARK” 3, 5 (2018).
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accomplishing that goal through mediation is even simpler than
going through the court process.
Notice prior to an eviction filing, coupled with the option to
mediate, would improve the likelihood of a tenant remaining in
their home by offering an opportunity for both parties to
communicate early on and negotiate a payment plan as an
alternative to the eviction process. Mediation facilitated prior to
eviction filing allows the tenant to negotiate from a better position
than in the stressful and confusing throes of the eviction process.
Pre-filing mediation also incentivizes participation in the mediation
process by landlords seeking to resolve the matter quickly, recover
rent due, and mitigate the costs of litigation. With a built-in
opportunity for mediation during the notice period, landlords would
be encouraged to resolve payment issues with their tenants through
mediation at this first stage, rather than initiating eviction. For
these reasons, notice and pre-filing mediation work hand-in-hand
to promote mediation by empowering tenants and incentivizing
landlords, resulting more likely in improved outcomes for both
parties.
C. Accessible Legal Information and Advice: Leveraging
Existing Tenant Protections
Mediation’s central tenets of neutrality, self-determination,
and informed consent come into tension when mediating parties
lack information about their legal rights. 151 To avoid perpetuating
the unequal negotiation power that already exists in the landlordtenant relationship, governing law should be available to both
parties during mediation. Mediators should be encouraged to
inform tenants of their legal rights to ensure they are able to make
informed decisions in mediation and come to an agreement that is
truly consensual and not coerced. The argument that mediators
have a duty to dismantle power imbalances to achieve true selfdetermination supports providing relevant legal information to
tenants in eviction mediation.
The American Bar Association’s Section of Dispute Resolution
recognizes both an informative and evaluative role for mediators
and expressly distinguishes mediation from the unauthorized
practice of law.152 Mediators may bring their knowledge of the
151. Kurtzberg & Henikoff, supra note 18, at 113–14.
152. Resolution on Mediation and the Unauthorized Practice of Law, Am. Bar
Ass’n
Section
of
Dispute
Resolution
(Feb.
2,
2002),
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subject matter into the mediation to manage expectations and help
the parties reach an agreement.153 However, mediators in
Minnesota do not have a legal duty to provide parties with legal
information about their rights.154 Mediators may hesitate to provide
legal information to mediating parties for fear of losing their
appearance of neutrality—even though the principles of selfdetermination and informed consent require it.155 However, this
reticence is inconsistent with the mediator’s duty to ensure the
parties “control . . . the outcome of the dispute” and as a result,
enter into a truly consensual, self-determined outcome.156 Without
crucial legal information about their rights, tenants may end up in
coerced agreements that lack their informed consent. The
mediator’s duty to ensure self-determination and informed consent
creates tension between this duty and the statute absolving them
from this duty.
In Minnesota, tenants have robust rights and protections
under state landlord-tenant law.157 However, tenants without
knowledge of landlord-tenant law are disadvantaged in mediation
when they lack critical information that could be used as a
negotiation tool.158 Access to governing law is necessary to prevent
a tenant from entering into a coerced agreement, 159 undermining
the most fundamental principles of mediation:

https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/dispute_resolu
tion/resolution2002.pdf [https://perma.cc/JU88-6NLL].
153. MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 114 app., advisory task force comment to 1997
amendment of Mediation R. (“The mediator may provide information about the
process, raise issues, offer opinions about the strengths and weaknesses of a case,
draft proposals, and help parties explore options.”).
154. MINN. STAT. § 572.35, subd. 1 (2019) (“[T]he mediator has no duty to protect
[the parties’] interests or provide them with information about their legal
rights . . . .”).
155. Kurtzberg & Henikoff, supra note 18, at 82–84 (presenting concerns
regarding the effect of providing legal information on a mediator’s perceived
neutrality, and ultimately rejecting these concerns in favor of a mediation process
focused on both the interests and rights of the parties).
156. Baylis & Carroll, supra note 15, at 293 (quoting Hilary Astor, Rethinking
Neutrality: A Theory to Inform Practice—Part 1, 10 AUSTRALASIAN DISP. RESOL. J.
73, 73 (2000)) (“If neutrality is focused on ‘ . . . what the mediator is doing to ensure
that, to the maximum extent possible, the parties control the content and the
outcome of the dispute[,’] then ensuring that both parties can act free from pressure
or coercion is imperative.”); accord Kurtzberg & Henikoff, supra note 18, at 113–14.
157. For an overview of the enumerated rights and responsibilities of tenants and
landlords in residential landlord-tenant relationships in Minnesota see MINN. STAT.
§§ 504B.281–.371 (2019).
158. See GRUNDMAN & KRUGER, supra note 104.
159. See MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 114 app., Mediation R. 1 (2019) (“A mediator shall
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Consensuality can only exist if both parties are making real and
free choices based on effective participation in a mediation. In
circumstances involving significant power differences the
mediator must attempt to ensure that the participation of all
parties is both genuine and active, and that any agreement
formed is not based on coercion or pressure.160

Access to relevant legal information should be made available
to tenants when the fourteen-day notice is given by the landlord to
allow the tenant to prepare for the mediation. This same
information should also be available to both parties for reference
during mediation sessions. Contents of a pre-eviction notice should
contain access points to relevant legal information, including the
Minnesota Attorney General’s Landlord Tenant Handbook, 161
which contains contact information for housing advocates and
mediation services, and landlord-tenant fact sheets available on
LawHelpMN.162 It is not enough that this information is available
online—it is not easily discovered by those unfamiliar with the legal
process, and online resources are not accessible to those who lack
internet access. These resources should be made accessible to
parties both prior to and during all mediation sessions, and their
use should be encouraged. Making this information accessible in a
‘neutral’ way can also help the mediator maintain their appearance
of neutrality in the mediation by referencing specific content in the
materials rather than raising the issue on their own.
Beyond access to legal information, legal advice from an
attorney would level the playing field for tenants who are not as
familiar with landlord-tenant law as their landlords. Studies of
tenant representation in mediation have observed that tenants
experience significantly better outcomes when represented by an
attorney.163 As discussed above, tenants experience better outcomes
recognize that mediation is based on the principle of self-determination by the
parties. It requires that the mediation process rely upon the ability of the parties to
reach a voluntary, uncoerced agreement.”).
160. Baylis & Carroll, supra note 15, at 292.
161. MINN. ATT’Y GEN. KEITH ELLISON, LANDLORDS AND TENANTS: RIGHTS AND
RESPONSIBILITIES 28, https://www.ag.state.mn.us/brochures/pubLandlordTenants.p
df [https://perma.cc/ZR7M-YJNW].
162. Housing, LAWHELPMN, http://lawhelpmn.org/issues/housing (last visited
Oct. 28, 2019).
163. Russell Engler, Connecting Self-Representation to Civil Gideon: What
Existing Data Reveal About When Counsel Is Most Needed, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
37, 67–68 (2010) (“[W]hile 15% of tenants retained possession after pro se instruction
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with legal representation; this is more than winning or losing a
case, but keeping or being displaced from a home. The American
Bar Association has adopted a resolution urging governments to
provide a civil right to counsel in cases “where basic human needs
are at stake, such as those involving shelter,” otherwise known as
Civil Gideon.164 Civil Gideon is necessary to guarantee tenants have
adequate legal knowledge and ability to negotiate agreements.
In a pre-filing scenario, the tenant could either seek legal
advice in advance of the mediation or find an attorney willing to
limit the scope of representation to the mediation. In a court
mediation setting, landlords are required to be represented by legal
counsel if they are incorporated as a business, 165 which further
diminishes the tenant’s negotiating power if they are unrepresented
in the eviction action.166 In a court mediation setting, attorneys can
ensure tenants know and assert their rights by reviewing
settlement agreements for tenants before they are entered before
the court.167 Attorney review of settlement agreements would
empower tenants by providing them with an understanding of the
legal merit of the case, possible defenses they have against an
eviction, and suggestions for obtaining a more favorable
settlement.168 In each of these settings, legal advice and
alone, when attorneys subsequently assisted the tenant in court-based mediation
under limited representation agreements, the figure jumped to 58%.”); Jean R.
Sternlight, Lawyerless Dispute Resolution: Rethinking a Paradigm, 37 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 381, 417 n.153 (2010).
164. TASK FORCE ON ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE ABA HOUSE OF
DELEGATES (Aug. 7, 2006), [https://perma.cc/88JL-5TS5] (“RESOLVED, That the
American Bar Association urges federal, state, and territorial governments to
provide legal counsel as a matter of right at public expense to low income persons in
those categories of adversarial proceedings where basic human needs are at stake,
such as those involving shelter, sustenance, safety, health or child custody, as
determined by each jurisdiction.”).
165. Nicollet Restoration, Inc. v. Turnham, 486 N.W.2d 753 (Minn. 1992) (holding
companies must be represented by an attorney). However, the Fourth District
Housing Court in Hennepin County does not follow this guidance and allows
corporations to appear without attorney representation by citing MINN. GEN. R.
PRAC. 603 and Hinckley Square Assoc. v. Cervene, 871 N.W.2d 426 (Minn. Ct. App.
2015). MCDONOUGH, supra note 102, at ch. VI.D.7.b.
166. Engler, supra note 163, at 68.
167. Tina Drake Zimmerman, Representation in ADR and Access to Justice for
Legal Services Clients, 10 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 181, 191 (2003) (“The
attorneys who were negative about mediation because of the poor results obtained
by pro se tenants believe that a dramatically different outcome would result if they
could represent the client in the mediation session.”).
168. Id.; Rebecca L. Sandefur, The Impact of Counsel: An Analysis of Empirical
Evidence, 9 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST., 51, 78 (2010) (“The impact of expanded access
to lawyers would likely be to increase the rates at which currently unrepresented
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representation can reduce the power imbalance between the parties
because the attorney-advocate can accurately assess the strength of
their claim and assert the tenant’s rights.
D. Equal Opportunity to Mediate: Structuring the Eviction
Mediation Process
A statutory eviction mediation process is necessary to ensure
the opportunity to mediate is available to all tenants. Without a
statutory eviction mediation process, landlord participation in
mediation prior to eviction filing is unlikely to increase if they can
rely on the court process to serve their interests. 169 In addition to
this, when mediation is offered at a landlord’s discretion, there is
the potential for discrimination. In eviction cases, a facially neutral
reason for eviction, such as nonpayment of rent, can result in
racially disparate outcomes.170 Therefore to ensure there is equal
opportunity for all tenants to participate in mediation, pre-filing
mediation must be incorporated into the current eviction process. 171
Though no states have a codified eviction mediation process,
Minnesota’s Farmer-Lender Mediation Act (FLMA) 172 provides a
useful model for constructing a statutory mediation program that
addresses power imbalances in negotiation. The FLMA protects
farmers in financial crisis from their creditors by affording them the
opportunity to negotiate debt issues through mediation. 173
Similarly, this model could protect tenants’ interest in their homes

people won their cases, because lawyers’ understanding of procedure would reveal
meritorious claims that are currently buried under unrepresented litigants’
confusion about, and misunderstanding of, the formal legal process.”).
169. Clare Pastore, Gideon Is My Co-Pilot: The Promise of Civil Right to Counsel
Pilot Programs, 17 U.D.C. L. REV. 75, 109 (2014) (“The managing attorney [of the
pre-eviction filing mediation pilot] . . . noted the difficulty of implementing
innovations which challenge the landlord bar’s predominant business model of
minimizing court appearances and meetings.”).
170. Greenberg, Gershenson & Desmond, supra note 9, at 128, 134, 140–44
(finding Hispanic tenants with white landlords experienced higher eviction rates
than similarly situated white tenants). Both intentional discriminatory motivation
and implicit bias can influence whether a landlord chooses to negotiate with a tenant
or file for eviction. Id. at 143–44.
171. Pastore, supra note 169, at 111, 128–29.
172. MINN. STAT. §§ 583.20–.32 (2019).
173. MINN. DEP’T OF AGRIC., FARMER-LENDER MEDIATION TASK FORCE REPORT, at
3 (2017), https://www.leg.state.mn.us/docs/2017/mandated/170424.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/5BHB-TGWE] (“The Farmer-Lender Mediation Act was passed by the
Legislature and signed into law in 1986 to help address the financial crisis that
Minnesota farmers were facing. The Farmer-Lender Mediation Act gives farmers the
opportunity to renegotiate, restructure, or resolve farm debt through mediation.”).
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by providing an opportunity for alternative dispute resolution prior
to initiation of an eviction action. The goals of the FLMA also closely
align with those of the eviction mediation process proposed in this
Note: “to achieve open communication between parties in order to
resolve differences, define the rights of the debtor and creditor, and
produce agreements that are acceptable to all parties.” 174 The
mediation process can reduce the power differential between the
two parties—both in the case of farmer and creditor as well as
tenant and landlord.
To address power inequality issues, elements of the FLMA
could be adapted into an eviction mediation process that includes
several of the recommendations discussed in this Note, including
required notice to the tenant, mediation at the tenant’s option, and
required provision of resources to assist the tenant with financial
matters and advocacy. For example, the FLMA requires a creditor
to send a mediation notice to the debtor prior to filing that gives the
debtor fourteen days to request mediation after receiving the
notice.175 Similarly, in the landlord-tenant context, the notice would
provide the tenant with knowledge of a pending action, allowing
them to take affirmative steps to prevent eviction by accessing
financial resources and legal assistance. The FLMA recognizes the
value of these measures and further requires the debtor be provided
with a financial analyst to assist them in preparing financial
information for the initial mediation, as well as a list of farm
advocates.176 Both of these requirements would give tenants the
resources necessary to negotiate with landlords in mediation and
ideally remain in their homes.
An important aspect of the FLMA’s notice requirement is that
while the opportunity to mediate is extended to all debtors, the
FLMA places the decision to do so in the hands of the farmer.177
Similarly, in the landlord-tenant context, there may be situations
174. Id. at 4.
175. MINN. STAT. § 583.26, subd. 1(a) (2019) (“A creditor desiring to start a
proceeding to enforce a debt against agricultural property . . . to terminate a contract
for deed to purchase agricultural property . . . or to garnish, levy on, execute on,
seize, or attach agricultural property, must serve an applicable mediation notice . .
.”); MINN. STAT. § 583.26, subd. 2 (2019).
176. MINN. STAT. § 583.26, subd. 3 (2019) (noting the list of farm advocates is
provided by the director of the University of Minnesota Agricultural Extension
Service).
177. MINN. STAT. § 583.26, subd. 2 (2019) (“A debtor must file a mediation request
form with the director by 14 days after receiving a mediation notice . . . . [A] debtor
who fails to file a timely mediation request waives the right to mediation for that
debt . . . .”).
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where a tenant does not want to mediate due to their personal
relationship with the landlord, potentially due to a history of
harassment, discrimination, or retaliatory behavior.178 These
situations are less likely to be an issue in the FLMA context and are
a sufficient reason to reject a mandatory mediation rule. Another
alternative to protecting tenants with personal relationships could
be a statutory exception to mediation for certain circumstances.179
For these reasons, the FLMA offers a useful model to apply to
eviction mediation. Informed by over 30 years of governing farm
debt, FLMA’s principles and goals can be applied to issues of power
that plague tenants in eviction disputes. Creating a statutory
mediation process is an important step to address these issues and
ensure tenants stay in their homes.
Conclusion
There are real costs to eviction—costs that are borne not only
by landlords and tenants as parties to the action, but also their
communities. Courts should not function as a de facto ‘bill collector’
for landlords, especially in circumstances that involve a person’s
home and may result in homelessness. 180 When a person misses a
mortgage payment, the first step is not foreclosure.181 Instead, a
person in danger of losing their home is provided with notice of their
178. Cf. Greenberg, Gershenson & Desmond, supra note 9, at 153, 153 n.252
(recommending mandatory mediation prior to eviction filing by pointing to the
success of mandatory foreclosure mediation in New York).
179. E.g., MINN. STAT. § 518.619 (2019) (providing an exception from mediation in
custody and visitation cases when there is a history of abuse between the parties);
Mass. S.J.C. Rule 1.18 URDR Rule 4(c)(i) (2019) (“[E]ach party shall be provided with
an opportunity to terminate the dispute resolution services, upon motion to the court
for good cause shown . . . .”); Mass. S.J.C. Rule 1.18 URDR Rule 4(c)(iii) (2019)
(“[T]he court shall explicitly inform parties that, although they are required to
participate, they are not required to settle the case while participating in dispute
resolution services . . . .”).
180. Email from Luke Grundman, Managing Attorney, Hous. Unit, MidMinnesota Legal Aid, to Anna Lamb, Referee Mark Labine, and Referee Melissa
Houghtaling (Mar. 18, 2018), reprinted in MINN. JUDICIAL BRANCH, JOINT PROPOSAL
FOR HOUSING COURT RULE CHANGES FROM THE SECOND AND FOURTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT HOUSING COURTS 163 (2018), http://www.mncourts.gov/mncourtsgov
/media/CIOMediaLibrary/Rule-603-Proposal-and-Related-Materials.pdf [https://pe
rma.cc/WY9Y-CX3J] (“Using housing court as the bill collector of first resort leads to
unnecessary filings, more social resources (Court staff, mediators, Legal Aid), and
long term damage to the tenant in the form of negative rental history reporting.”).
181. A mortgagee is required to inform a mortgagor of loss mitigation options
available through the servicer before referring the loan to foreclosure and make the
debtor aware of foreclosure prevention counseling resources. MINN. STAT. §§ 582.043,
subd. 5, 580.021, subd. 2 (2019).
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missed payment, payment plan options, and foreclosure prevention
counseling.182 Renters facing the eviction process merit these same
dignities.
Reducing the forced displacement of tenants supports both
individual dignity and community prosperity—and can be achieved
through mediation. However, for mediation to be effective in
preventing eviction, it must be a tool of empowerment. This is not
possible in a system that prioritizes the convenience and expediency
of eviction. Effective mediation requires time, opportunity, and
equal access to the protection of the law. To be an effective
alternative to the eviction process, both parties must be incentivized
and empowered to mediate. With reform of unlawful detainer
classification and disclosure, systemic obstacles to negotiation are
dismantled and tenants gain incentive to mediate. Instituting a
notice period prior to filing an eviction encourages both parties to
participate in mediation to negotiate an agreement to allow tenants
to remain in their homes and avoid an eviction filing. Finally, and
most importantly, access to legal resources and representation are
necessary for tenants to effectively represent themselves in
mediation. A statutory eviction mediation process, modeled after
the Farmer Lender Mediation Act, is necessary to ensure that the
opportunity to mediate is extended to all tenants and that these
strategies are incorporated into a comprehensive approach to
reduce the power differential between landlords and tenants and
achieve successful mediated agreements. Promoting successful
mediation in eviction disputes enables both parties to negotiate
mutually beneficial agreements, curtails ineffective and excessive
use of the eviction process, and improves housing stability by
preventing tenant displacement. By reducing this harmful
displacement, we preserve homes, livelihoods, and communities.

182. See supra note 181.

